Another article discusses both the elections in Lebanon from a more Middle Eastern/Arab perspective. It notes that in the Middle East there are both real free elections (like in Iraq now) and fake elections (like Iraq under Saddam). While the majority fall under the later type of elections, the former are happening some in the Middle East and those have domestic and regional implications. A case and point are the Palestinian elections where Hamas took over which was meet by a negative reaction from the US, Israel and Egypt. In June, there will be two more Middle Eastern elections that are generally speaking free: Lebanon on June 7 and Iran on June 12. Lebanon has two major political coalitions which could be called the March 8th and March 14th coalitions. The March 8th Alliance is named after a rally in Beirut the Hezbollah organized and consist of Hezbollah, Nabih Berri’s Amal party, and the secular Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of General Michel Aoun. Berri is a Shia Muslims and Aoun is a Maronite Christian and so Berri draws Shia Muslims and Aoun draws support from this and other Christian constituencies. The March 14 Alliance is also named after an anti-Syrian demonstration in Beirut and happened a month after Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri’s assignation and led to Syrian troops being removed from Lebanon after 29 years. March 14 is the Western-backed and ruling coalition and consist of Sunni, Druze, and Christian parties led by Saad Hariri, billionaire son of Rafiq, whose Future Movement make up its largest bloc. These two groups have a tense and opposing relationship to a point that the government was once shut down by they came to an agreement and elected consensus nominee Michel Suleiman as president. To understand Lebanon’s elections requires a understanding of how it’s parliament is structured. It’s Chamber of Deputies (America’s Congress) consist of 128 seats divided equally between Christians and Muslims and then divided again by the 18 recognized religious sects in the county. This is not based on recent demographic information since Lebanon’s last census was in 1932. Currently, in their Congress the March 14 Alliance holds 70 seats and March 8, 58. Since the Shia candidates all belong to the March 8th alliance and the Sunni candidates belong to March 14 alliance, this is not where the balance of power will change. Instead it depends on how the Christians vote. Whether they back Aoun’s FPM or to Christian parties affiliated with March 14. Most analysts say only 30 seats are actually toss-ups and March 8 needs to only win seven to gain a majority. The article states that Hassan Nasrallah seems willing to build a coalition to rule Lebanon but that Hariri does not agree if March 14 does not win. It then notes that Sec. of State Clinton came to Beirut and threatens a reduction in aid if March 8 wins and that Israel is doing military exercises to scare the Lebanese. Still, the article argues that this election may show that lose in influence of those in the Middle East who are US supporters and that on June 7th Lebanon has a chance to show the Arab world that if “little Lebanon” can split from the US backed alliance, so can they.
Another article looks at the role of personal freedom in the Iranian elections coming up. In Iran, they still have control over personal appearance, clothing and hairstyle. Iran believes in “collective morality” and thus the country has been working to enforce Islamic modesty by preventing un-Islamic conduct like western clothing. Presidential candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi, a former prime minster and possibly the strongest of the reformist candidates, has said he will end these restrictions and this seems like a savvy political promise. After all, 70% of the population is under 30 but there are questions about whether he is sincere and if he can achieve these goals. Since 1997, social freedom has been a big issue in the Iranian elections and Mohammad Khatami’s promises of social freedom to the youth led to his landslide victories by getting voters who normally do not care about political to become invested. While he keeps his promise in some ways with some increases in freedoms, the morality police also stayed in power. When the issue came up in 2005, even Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (who we now consider a hardliner) spoke positively of greater personal freedom. In reality, the crackdown on "un-Islamic" behavior increased under Ahmadinejad and his government did little more than blame others for this increase. The truth is that it sees that presidents have limited power in regards to the morality police. This is mainly because Iran has many centers of power and unless they agree, the morality police will stay. Still, this pledge is political popular and most candidates play lip service to it. The issue is that the youth may not trust candidates like Mousavi when he says he cares about their freedoms. He claims to have both reformists and hardliners support but he has to win to do anything and the young may be too cynical to trust him with their votes.